U.S. Defense

     General Ricardo Sanchez, the former commander of coalition forces in Iraq, has belittled the service of Bernard Kerik for failing to produce results while Kerik was the interim minister of interior of Iraq in 2003. In that position, Kerik was supposed to oversee the rebuilding of the National Police, the Intelligence Service and the Border and Customs Police. None of which have performed their jobs effectively. Thus one of the most important positions in Iraq in 2003 was squandered while the resistance movement grew.      

     The goal of an occupation is to gradually turn military operations into police operations and a militarized state into one of civilian control based on law and order. Therefore, fielding a viable police force with political legitimacy amongst its own people should be the first priority of any occupation. Indigenous people are more likely to support security forces from their own country rather than foreigners with alien values and beliefs. Without an indigenous police force, the occupying soldiers have to conduct the necessary police operations, which they are ill-equipped culturally to do.          

     In a guerrilla war, there is a constant struggle between the occupier and the insurgents for the allegiance of the people. If the insurgent is seen as a genuine resistance fighter, his presence will be concealed from the occupiers and no intelligence on his activities will be forthcoming. The goal of the occupiers is to erase the perception of the insurgent as a heroic resistance fighter and instead make it clear that attacking the security forces is a crime and the resistance is not heroic, but criminal. Once the resistance fighter is seen as a criminal, then actionable intelligence will be given to the security forces         

     Ultimately, capturing insurgents should be a matter of local Iraqi police forces picking up wanted criminals. We shouldn’t be seeing US forces conducting house to house searches, roadblocks, checkpoints or protecting VIPs. Every “police” operation our combat forces engage in is another example of how we have failed to accomplish our most important mission in Iraq: building up the Iraqi police and army so they can effectively take the place of the foreigners with alien values and beliefs.  

General Petraeus has been tapped to be the new commander of Central Command and his current deputy, Lt-Gen Ray Odierno will succeed him as Commanding General, Multi-National Force - Iraq. It’s interesting to note that like most generals in the army, both men do not have combat experience as infantrymen. 

When I was a soldier in the early 1990s, all of our generals and senior sergeants had Combat Infantry Badges (CIB) from Vietnam and they were hardcore. You could tell just by looking at them that these old guys were killers. I don’t know how many generals are left with Vietnam service, but it can’t be many, although retired General Tommy Franks who commanded the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 was a Vietnam veteran. His successor, General Abizaid had a CIB but it was for taking part in the invasion of the small, helpless Caribbean country of Grenada, which could hardly be considered “war.” After him came Admiral Fallon who was a Navy pilot in Vietnam, but again, no infantry combat experience. Now General Petraeus will be in charge of Central Command and he and Odierno do not have CIBs.

The CIB is the mark of a combat soldier who has been there, done that and got the stories to go with it. It used to be that having a CIB was practically a prerequisite for any infantry officer trying to become a general. I can’t remember seeing or reading about any general from 1945 up through the 1990s who didn’t have the CIB on his uniform.

Since Vietnam however, actual ground combat has been a rare occurrence and therefore not many officers from the 1970s – 1990s have seen real action. This is reflected in the lack of CIBs amongst currently serving general officers. General Petraeus, for instance,  does not have a CIB. He does have the newly created Combat Action Badge, which apparently generals can receive, which is ridiculous. How many generals have had to “close with and destroy the enemy” in Iraq? Did Petraeus engage in urban combat and clear buildings room by room? I am not calling his bravery into question or his toughness. He must be tough to survive a gunshot to the chest even if it was from one of his own soldiers. But to give a general who is sitting in a Tactical Operations Center the same badge as the soldiers who are fighting and dying on his orders lessens the award. That is why the CIB can only be given out to colonels and below. At least colonels might actually be somewhat near a firefight at some point.

Just because most army generals have never been in direct combat doesn’t mean they aren’t as competent directing combat operations as those who have. But to the grunts on the front line it probably matters a lot to know if the guy ordering you to fight and perhaps die has been in the same situation himself and knows what he is asking.  

In addition to the physical casualties US ground troops are incurring, there are the just as debilitating psychological casualties as well. The US Army is alarmed about the growing number of active and veteran soldiers who have PTSD or will be possible future victims of it. The New York Times reports that a recent study by the US Army surgeon general’s Mental Health Advisory Team shows that “among combat troops sent to Iraq for the third or fourth time, more than one in four show signs of anxiety, depression or acute stress,” which are signs of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Considering the fact that the Army will have to send more soldiers than ever back to Iraq on multiple tours has the Army concerned about the long term effect on not just the soldiers themselves, but on the Army as a whole and its ability to defend US interests in the world. In other words, tactical combat stress in Iraq is becoming a matter of strategic concern for the Department of Defense.

Every war takes its toll on the men who fight in it. Some wars more than others, however. The type of combat and the terrain soldiers are fighting in, along with the motives for fighting seem to have a direct effect on how many and what kind of psychological stress soldiers will suffer from.

The type of combat engaged in Iraq is a guerrilla war in an urban setting. Without a doubt the worst combination of factors a soldier can be up against. Urban combat is the most deadly terrain for an attacking army. It is as close and personal as war can get. It also requires great speed and violence of action. Life or death can be decided in a matter of seconds, if that long. Since the guerrillas will be operating amongst civilians either by force or willingly, civilians will be killed and possibly in greater numbers than combatants. Women and children will also be caught in the crossfire and killed either by accident or as a tactical necessity.

The enemy is unknown and most of the time unseen. He leaves improvised explostive devices that kill anonymously, he attacks from inside crowds that protect him, he attacks where and when least expected. He can even be a she. The soldier can never fully trust anybody not to be a combatant in an urban guerrilla war. This feeling of always being in a combat situation wherever they go is a constant stress factor. In a war without a discernable frontline, combat and the potential to become a casualty is a 24 hours a day, 360 degree reality.

 Besides combat, other factors are: a civilian population that does not welcome foreigners, an unpopular war with an open-ended mission, a lack of predictability and an alien culture with different norms. 

The NY Times report continues, “the range of symptoms reported by soldiers varies widely, from sleeplessness and anxiety to more severe depression and stress. To assist soldiers facing problems, the Army has begun to hire more civilian mental health professionals while directing Army counselors to spend more time with frontline units.” At last the Army is beginning to accept the fact that PTSD is a real casualty inducing phenomena and the best way to heal it is to be where it happens and when it happens, in the combat zone with the combat troops. 

4,000

From March 13-16, former soldiers who served in Iraq and Afghanistan are giving eyewitness testimony to what they did in that country. Unlike filtered news from the military, or the biased news from the media, this is the visceral truth, straight from the frontlines. Whether you are against the occupation or for it, finding out what is really going on in Iraq is a requirement to help clarify your point of view.

The courage of these soldiers is undeniable and I am not talking about their actions in combat. Exposing their innermost thoughts and revealing things about themselves that they would normally only share with their combat buddies is perhaps the bravest act of their military service. And it is a great service to their country and history as well.

To watch the video, go to www.ivaw.org.

In this month’s Esquire magazine, Thomas Barnett fawns over Admiral Fallon, Commander of Central Command (CENTCOM). He laughably calls Fallon “The Man Between War and Peace.” Fallon is not between anything. As commander of CENTCOM he is currently waging two wars and will unhesitatingly start another one if he feels it is necessary.

It’s ironic that the media first painted Fallon as the man who was specifically chosen by the Bush administration to lead a war against Iran. The thought behind this was that since the Army was bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq, it couldn’t possibly invade Iran. Therefore, Iran had to be attacked by the Air Force and Navy because they were the only branches of the military not hollowed out by those two occupations. They were ready for the kill. Who better to lead the air attack than a former ground attack pilot and commander of carrier battle groups?

Now the media would have us believe he is serving as a spoiler to Bush’s plan to attack Iran. They quote him saying negative things about Petraeus (which is possible, flag rank officers tend to be arrogant and disparaging of each other), and that an attack on Iran won’t happen on his watch (doubtful he ever said that). If any regional commander tried to spoil his commander in chief’s plans, then that regional commander would be fired and a more pliant officer put in his place. After all, the military is supposed to obey the civilians, not the other way around.

Barnett’s article is a liberal’s dream: a decorated admiral and regional commander standing up to President Bush and preventing him from starting another war. Unfortunately, ‘tis but a dream. A more realistic assessment of Fallon is by Chris Floyd who writes that there are only “a few mild disagreements between Fallon and the White House over certain questions of tactics, timing and presentation in regard to American domination of a vast range of nations and peoples.” A mere question of tactics, not strategy. On that, they are in perfect agreement; the military option is still on the table for Iran. And if it comes to war, the good admiral says, “These guys are ants. When the time comes, you crush them.”

Fallon is a Man Of War and will go to war when ordered to do so. War is not just his job, it is his way of life.

UPDATE: Fallon has been forcibly “retired,” but the reasons are why I said they would be. The commander in chief has lost confidence in Fallon and can’t be perceived as not having a unified team for his foreign policy. The next commander will have learned from the Fallon example and be much more compliant with the president’s views.

Apparently, the senior brass of the US military are unsure of Obama’s “leadership” qualities to be commander in chief. However, what is their definition of leadership? What qualities make a good commander in chief? Does previous military experience matter for this position?

Personal military experience doesn’t help unless the person was of flag rank and was in command of vast amounts of men and material. Otherwise, what difference does it make what someone did when they were in their early 20s? The only president I can think of whose military experience had a direct bearing on his role as commander in chief is Eisenhower. As Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe he managed an international coalition and oversaw the strategy of an entire theater of war. This knowledge could have definitely been helpful had Eisenhower decided to go to war. However, he never involved the military in anything more serious than a show of force, perhaps because he had seen war and knew how terrible it was firsthand.

Which presidents have had similar experiences? George W. Bush was a fighter pilot in the National Guard. This means he flew planes over Texas one weekend a month. How did this experience qualify him to wage counter-insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq? The president before him, Bill Clinton, never served in the military. George H. W. Bush flew a dive bomber against Japanese aircraft carriers in the Pacific Campaign of WWII. 45 years later, how did this experience help him wage a mechanized desert campaign in Iraq? Ronald Reagan served as a public relations officer in California during WWII. Gerald Ford served aboard a carrier in the Pacific. What action he saw was meaningless to the Vietnam War. I could go through the careers of Nixon, Johnson and Kennedy, but none of their personal experiences in the military helped them to make decisions as commander in chief during the Vietnam War.

I spent three years in the infantry, deployed to two combat zones and if I was elected president in November, I would have no more knowledge of being commander in chief than someone like Obama who never spent a day in the military. What does my experience occupying Somalia in 1993 have to do with the current occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq? Do I have some sort of esoteric knowledge that would allow me to make the right decisions that someone who never heard a shot fired in anger might not be able to make? The only thing I might know is how much it truly sucks to be there and how badly the troops want to come home. I may feel for the plight of the grunts but I would have larger considerations, such as the national security of the United States of America.

What experience do the three leading candidates have? Obama and Clinton never served in the military at all. McCain’s experience consists of flying bombing missions over Vietnam, eventually being shot down and made a prisoner for over five years. He courageously defied his captors and returned with honor, but how does this give him commander in chief experience? Unless he is going to help teach SERE school, McCain’s military experience has not given him any more qualifications than the average man on the street.

In an article in the Washington Times, General John Keane, an architect of the Iraq War said, “Anyone who is advocating a precipitous pullout of U.S. forces, believing this will be a catalyst for political progress, does not understand the realities of Iraq and the minds of the key political leaders.” Does Keane have the right to talk about the “realities of Iraq?” This is a man who admitted he “never saw the insurgency coming.” I was able to figure out that there would be an Iraqi national resistance long before we attacked and I left the army as a Specialist.  

However, the military’s real problem with Obama becoming commander in chief is not where he stands on Iraq or his lack of experience, it is his possible willingness to curb our record breaking military spending, which is more than the rest of the world combined. “Defense industry executives worry that Mr. Obama will end six years of defense budget increases and, as he has repeatedly said on the campaign trail and in debates, tap into war and military funds to support his plan for universal health care.”

According to the military brass, this is the real qualification for being a good commander in chief: whether the candidate will support a “strong” military or not. In this case, “strong” does not mean effective or even able to win wars. It means an ever increasing budget for them to play with.

The US military has geographically divided up the world into six regional “commands.” Northern Command, which was created in the wake of the September 11 attacks, is based in NORAD in Colorado. European Command is based in Stuttgart, Germany, so it is right in the middle of its area of responsibility (AOR). Pacific Command has as its AOR, the Pacific Ocean, Australia, and Southeast Asia, so it is well placed in Hawaii. Southern Command is in charge of controlling Latin America. Until 1997, it was located in Panama, but since the Panama Canal Treaty, SOUTHCOM was forced to relocate to Miami, Florida, because no country in the region would host it. However, it is at least still close to the region it is responsible for. That leaves Central Command and Africa Command. 

CENTCOM has been the busiest command since 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait. At the time, many observers thought CENTCOM would take the opportunity to relocate itself to Kuwait, but it stayed in its home base in Tampa, Florida. Basing an entire command in its AOR may not be necessary nor even productive anymore. The new paradigm seems to be instead of one major headquarters, having many smaller ones dotted around the AOR. This is a new concept that the CENTCOM is trying out in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Horn of Africa. The commander, General Lovelace said, the war on terror and a need to be more operationally focused compelled the Army to alter its approach. “You don’t have the element of time on your side anymore, like we did in the Cold War. We’ve got to be ready tonight. That’s why now you have that broader commitment. This is a big, dynamic theater. We track little hot spots in a time that’s exceedingly important to our nation.” George Bush’s current trip to Africa is being seen by some as laying the groundwork for the same diversified command structure for AFRICACOM, which is currently located in Germany. Bush has denied this even though every country he has visited has expressed interest in having AFRICACOM set up its base there. However, Bush did clarify that “that doesn’t mean we won’t develop some kind of office somewhere in Africa.”

From 1979 to 1989, the Soviet Army attempted to occupy Afghanistan and defeat an insurgency of Afghan rebels. They failed and two years later found their own country falling to pieces and with it, the Soviet Bloc’s collective security alliance, the Warsaw Pact. Although, the Russian Afghan War was not the main reason the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact dissolved, it definitely played a role. Now with the US Army mired in an Afghan insurgency of its own, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has been trying to push America’s NATO allies to help out. Although Gates is right to seek more allies and  troops for Afghanistan, he is conveniently forgetting why they are needed in the first place. After the US military invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, it should have devoted the vast resources that were necessary to winning the peace afterwards because a scattered Taliban does not mean a defeated Taliban. Instead, those resources were sent to fight a war in Iraq, which was being effectively contained and wasn’t an imminent threat to the stability of the Middle East, or America. Now, bogged down in two quagmires, the US has to go begging with bowl in hand to allies it has denigrated in the past. Gates has to even resort to empty threats saying, “NATO is a collective security agreement, a military alliance. The members have signed up with certain obligations in this regard. But if it were to become the case that some allies are not prepared to fulfill their military obligations, while others continue to do so, I think that that is a very dangerous situation for the future of the alliance.”

Afghanistan indirectly caused the end of the Warsaw Pact. It would be ironic if it did the same to NATO.

The Department of Defense released its figure for the 2009 budget: $518.3 billion. As this article points out, that number is only the military portion of the budget. There are other expenditures that could be easily classified as funding national security also. First, the $70 billion the DOD requested to fight the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Secondly, the requested $17.1 billion the Department of Energy needs to maintain our country’s nuclear weapons. Then there is Homeland Security, the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, the State Department, and many other departments and agencies that relieve the DOD of some of the debt burden. The grand total of our national security state comes to well over $600 billion.

America’s national security budget is only 4-5% of its GDP, which ranks it 28th in the world on military expenditures as a  percentage of GDP. However, the US ranks #1 on total expenditure and in fact, spends more on defense than every other country in the world combined.