Been on travel so haven’t found time to Blog.  Before I hit the road, I participated in a Department of Defense sponsored Bloggers roundtable on Monday, August 23rd with Lieutenant General William Caldwell the Commander of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan.  It was enlightening and informative.  As discussed in previous Blogs, this training is a critical part of the COIN strategy.  Although training has been ongoing since at least 2002, the NATO training command was only activated in November 2009.  General Caldwell began by explaining the mission stating it is essentially to develop Afghanistan’s Ministries of Interior and Defense. 

The General didn’t pull any punches.  He remarked before the command was activated, “the development of the Afghan National Security Force…was hampered by a lack of resources…there was little time really dedicated to building and developing the Afghan National Security Force as an enduring force…key inputs that addressed the professionalism and quality of the force, such as leader development, losses from attrition and literacy of soldiers and police were overlooked.”

General Caldwell said beginning in 2002 “the average raw growth was about 15,000 personnel in the Afghan National Army (ANA) and about 12,000 in the Afghan National Police (ANP)…These numbers were below the requirement to meet both the ANA and the ANP strength goals.”  The trend has been reversed and both the ANA and ANP goals are currently three months ahead of schedule.

From the General’s perspective the biggest challenge is building a professional, self sustaining security force.  To achieve this goal the training is focusing on three things, “leader development, literacy and addressing losses through attrition.  General Caldwell says leadership is the most important element and training efforts are “focused on quality training, developing experience and providing appropriate education…dedicated to creating an ethos of service and loyalty.  It is only when the leaders embrace a culture of service to others that the Afghan national security force will truly be professional force.”

As of last week, the Afghan Army numbered 134,000 and the Police force 115,000. The goal is by October 2011 for the army to reach 171, 600 and for the police to reach 134,000.  The General stated attrition is the biggest obstacle to professionalization.  These losses include desertions, deaths and low retention…based on the current attrition rates…to meet their 31 October 2011 goal of 305,000, we together will need to recruit and train 141,000 soldiers and police.”  The attrition issue was one that also jumped out at me.  The day before the Bloggers Roundtable, the New York Times had published a story on the attrition issue.  According to the article 646 Afghan police were killed in 2009, compared with 412 foreign coalition troops and 282 Afghan Army personnel.  The article further stated that this year the police were being killed by the Taliban at a rate of four to six a day.  I asked General Caldwell to comment on the article.

He said the number of police deaths was greater than the number of Afghan Army deaths but they working very hard on the problem, “we’re looking at the training and equipping and whether or not there’s something we should do to modify how, in fact, we continue to train local police here in the future and…perhaps even some different type of equipment.” 

It’s clear to me after participating in this series of Blogger Roundtables that a lot of people are working very hard on this part of the COIN strategy.  It’s also clear that the July 2011 deadline probably at least at this point doesn’t mean all of the NATO forces will pack up and go home on that date.  An article about a press conference with Afghan Ministry of Defense spokesperson Major General Zahir Azimi quoted him stating, “Over talking on whether foreign forces will be pulled out by 2011 or not will only help the enemy gain more energy.”  In response to questions about the withdrawal of Coalition forces, he reportedly indicated “while Afghan forces will be able to take responsibility for the lead in operations by 2014, that it does not mean Afghanistan will be abandoned by its partners.”

Well that’s about it for me.  I’m sure I’ll be blogging about this topic again. As always my views are my own.  I’ll be writing a Blog on my take of the Iraqi force drawdown in the next day or so. 

Reports of continuing misery caused by the flooding tragedy continue to come out of Pakistan.  The flooding has affected one fifth of that nation, killed 1,600 and is affecting as many as 20 million people.  According to a BBC report, “Tens of thousands of villages remain underwater and there are warnings the crisis may worsen as flood waters continue to surge south along the Indus River.”

Last weekend, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon visited the region and said it was the worst disaster he’d ever seen.  The U.N. has set a goal of $460 million in aid.  Yesterday, Secretary of State Clinton announced total U.S. aid would be $150 million, up from an initial pledge of $92 million.  According to BBC reports, the European Union has increased its pledge to $180 million, the United Kingdom has pledged $100 million, Germany has pledged $32 million, and Saudi Arabia was pledging $100 million.

I recently had the opportunity to participate in two Department of Defense (DoD) Bloggers Round Tables focused on department Pakistan disaster relief efforts.  It is worth noting that the U.S. military response is just one part of a much larger U.S. government effort.  As of August 18^th, the DoD reported, “There currently are 22 U.S. military and civilian aircraft in Pakistan in support of flood relief operations. U.S. helicopters have evacuated more than 4600 people and delivered more than 500,000 pounds of relief supplies. In addition, U.S. military cargo aircraft based in Afghanistan have transported more than 194,000 pounds of international aid from the Pakistan Air Force’s Central Flood Relief Cell in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, to required locations throughout the country in support of Government of Pakistan airlift support requests.”

The participating helicopters have been from Army units stationed in Afghanistan, Marine helicopters which flew in from the amphibious ship, USS Peleliu and Navy helicopters which flew into Pakistan from Bahrain.  Weather has been a major challenge.  On August 13^th, General Michael Nagata, Deputy Commander, Office of the Defense Representative, Pakistan:  “Yes, the weather is certainly a factor.  Of the available flying days we’ve had since the task force began its activities…we’ve been completely ready to go, as have a large number of Pakistani military aviation elements and their helicopters.  But the weather in the Swat Valley are that we’ve been trying to get to…has simply not allowed it”. 

Navy helo pilot, Lieutenant (Lt) Sean Snyder echoed the General’s concern in a August 19 interview, stating:  “We’ve been on the ground for six days…and the first couple of days here, the weather was pretty bad…you’ve got to wait for the clouds to clear trying to get over the mountains and down in the valley.”  Lt Snyder also indicated the high altitudes the helos had to fly presented some unique challenges “the higher we get in altitude, the less we can carry…the harder it is or can be to control your descent and approaches to these higher zones”.

When asked about security threats, General Nagata remarked:   “…while there is obviously, a militant threat in this region, not just in Pakistan, there are some security challenges here, but the Pakistani military…have done simply an incredibly energetic and totatally committed job at  providing multiple layers of security around our activities both in the air and on the ground.  And frankly, we’ve just seen no evidence of a threat so far.”  Lt Snyder also said he had not seen any evidence of groups like the Taliban operating on the ground.  Petty Officer Second Class Kevin Strickhouser, part of Snyder’s crew also praised the Pakistan military saying they “had everything under control” while the disaster relief operations were being conducted.

Pakistan reportedly has 45 helicopters and some 60,000 troops devoted to the relief efforts.  They are the ones coordinating where the helicopters fly into and are also providing security on the ground.

All reporting indicates this disaster is still unfolding.  What will be worth monitoring is how this affects the stability of the Pakistan government.  The Pakistan military appears to be getting high marks but there are reports that many Pakistanis are dissatisfied with the government conduct during this crisis.  It will also be interesting to see if there are more reports of the Pakistan Taliban taking advantage of the situation to improve their image with the population by providing aid. 

As always, my opinions are my own.             

Yesterday the New York Times published an article titled U.S. Military Seeks Slower Pace to Wrap Up Afghan Role.  The opening paragraph stated:  “American military officials are building a case to minimize the planned withdrawal of some troops from Afghanistan starting next summer, in an effort to counter growing pressure on President Obama from inside his own party to begin winding the war down quickly”.  The article goes on to state that General Petraeus is going to go on a media campaign in the next few days pointing to some signs of progress as evidence that “a rapid withdrawal” is not a good idea.  The article also quotes an unknown senior official remarking:  “…while we’ve been in Afghanistan for nine years, only in the past 12 months or so have we started doing this right, and we need to give it some time and think about what our long term presence in Afghanistan should look like”.

With that as a backdrop, I’d like to continue sharing the results of several recent Department of Defense (DoD) Bloggers roundtables I participated in featuring interviews with some of the key people involved in training the Afghans.  As mentioned in earlier blogs, training of Afghans is a major part of the second stage of the COIN strategy.  A brief review might help for clarification purposes.  There are three stages to a COIN campaign.  The initial stage is to stop the bleeding; the middle is characterized as inpatient recovery, and the third outpatient care – movement to self-sufficiency.

The characteristics of the second stage are taken directly from the COIN manual and are as follows: 

MIDDLE STAGE: “INPATIENT CARE—RECOVERY”

•         Characterized by efforts aimed at assisting the patient through long-term recovery or restoration of health—which in this case means achieving stability and civil security.

•         The desire in this stage is to develop and build resident capability and capacity in the Host Nation (HN) government and security forces.

•          Focus expands to include governance, provision of essential services, and stimulation of economic development.

•         Relationships with HN counterparts in the government and security forces and with the local populace are developed and strengthened.

•         The host nation increases its legitimacy through providing security, expanding effective governance, providing essential services, and achieving incremental success in meeting public expectations.

There has been a lot of effort and progress in this area.  Yesterday I got a chance to speak with Air Force Brigadier General Michael Boera who is in charge of training the Afghan Air Force.  According to the General, the Afghan Air force has grown 52% since November 2009 with current total of about 3,900 airmen.  They have 49 aircraft with plans to expand and modernize the aircraft.  For instance, currently the Afghans have 6 of the C-27 cargo aircraft.  There are plans to expand to 20.

General Boera states the mission is “to set the conditions for a professional, fully independent and operationally capable Afghan Air Force, ready to meet the security needs of Afghanistan today as well as tomorrow”.  The General said the Afghan Air Force has progressed and done some great things just in the past month and went on to reveal they have four helicopters involved in the humanitarian mission in Pakistan.  The efforts to help flood victims were coordinated between Afghanistan and Pakistan with no U.S. advisors involved in the process.

The week before the start of these operations, the eastern part of Afghanistan also suffered major floods.  Using two helicopters, the Afghans rescued over 2,100 people that were stranded by flood waters.  The helos did have U.S. crew members aboard, not because they were needed but because joint crew flights had been scheduled for the day.  The Afghan Air Force has also been involved in other humanitarian and disaster relief.  When Kyrgyzstan had their recent uprisings, Afghan helos went to that nation, conducting a noncombatant evacuation (NEO) of Afghan students that were stranded during the conflict.  Boera also indicated currently the Air force is preparing for election support. “…this will be the third time the Afghan air force assets are used to support pushing the ballot boxes out to those remote areas of Afghanistan so that it can maximize how many Afghans can vote”.

Training continues.  Last November 17 courses were offered, currently there are 36 courses and that number will rise to 70 by November.  Eventually there will be 104 courses offered.

Future of Afghan National Police

On July 22, I participated in a DoD Bloggers roundtable on the Afghan Police with Dr. Jack Kem, Deputy to the Commander, NATO Training Mission Afghanistan.  Dr. Kem addressed corruption charges early in the interview stating, “…at times you’ve no doubt heard criticisms of the Afghan National Police.  Some of those criticisms are founded and others are not.  But one of the tings the Afghan Ministry of Interior is doing to combat criticisms of the force is to professionalize the national police, and build a force that will serve the people of Afghanistan well into the future”. 

Dr. Kem said this sounds simple but is not and indicated there are 4 traits “that turn a job into a profession, and into a lifetime of service”.  These are:

Education and training

Skills Development

Long term professional development

Ethics

Addressing the corruption issue, Dr. Kem remarked:  “We are helping the Afghans develop the code of ethics, and that code…has three components…service to the nation, a respect for the citizens, and the integrity of public service”.  They’ve also changed the pay structure so police are being paid wages they can live off of and therefore hopefully take away the incentive to take bribes.  When asked about reports of police not being paid, Dr. Kem responded that there have been some problems.  Over 90% are paid via electronic transfer of funds.  Some of the police are stationed in areas that lack ATMs or banking systems.  They are working to solve that issue.

The police force currently stands at 106,000 with a goal of 109,000 by the end of October.  Attrition continues to be an issue but those numbers have dropped from a high of 20% to 10 – 12%.  Dr. Kem indicated there is one exception, a higher attrition for members of the Afghan National Civil Order Police, but they’re working on solving that problem with things like incentive pay because those forces deploy throughout the country away from home.

When asked to talk about gratifying “a-ha moments” of Afghan police changing their mind sets as a result of the ethics training, Kem stated: “I think is when you start to see more and more women that are coming in the Afghan National Police.  There is a goal now to have about 5,000 police officers recruited in the next two years who are women…the ‘a-ha moment’ is for many of the Afghan: when they realize that it does make sense, culturally right to having a woman doing the inspection of another woman.  And if you’re going to have somebody do that kind of inspection or that kind of check on somebody at the border, then that woman should be trained, that woman should be literate, just like you would expect the other border police and other police officers”.

Think I’ll stop here and cover the rest within the next day or so.  My intent with this series of blogs is to highlight some parts of the COIN strategy that are not getting much play elsewhere.  I believe if we’re to make intelligent informed decisions about the course our national strategy should take, we need to gather as much information as we can. This is an issue too important to rely on media sound bites interspersed with stories of Hollywood celebrities gone wild.

As always, my views are my own.  Think I’ll go for a bike ride.

On August 2, 2010 the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) announced they would hold a joint cooperative air defense exercise with the Russian Federation Air Force (http://www.norad.mil/News/2010/080210.html). This is the first ever air defense exercise between Russia and NORAD and will include U.S., Canadian, and Russian participants operating from command centers at Elmendorf Air Force Base and Khabarovsk, Russia.  The exercise is named Vigilant Eagle and will be held from 8-11 August.

The NORAD announcement stated the “exercise is authorized under a cooperative military agreement signed by the presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States of America.  The agreement tasks NORAD, the bi-national U.S. and Canadian command, and the Russian Federation Air Force to conduct a live-fly exercise for up to five days”.

The exercise has a terrorist theme.  The premise is a U.S. commercial aircraft has been taken over by terrorists.  According to NORAD, the exercise “will consist of two international flights:  one originating in Alaska and traveling to the Far East followed by one originating in the Far East and traveling to Alaska”.  NORAD and Russia will practice shadowing the flights with fighter aircraft.

The significance to me is even though there are still areas of disagreement like missile defense; there is a continuing thaw in U.S. and Russian military to military relations.  It is especially ironic when you recall during the Cold War, NORAD’s primary mission was to defend North America against an attack from the former Soviet Union.  The theme from the old TV show Twilight Zone is currently running around in my head.  What’s next, Russian joining NATO?  Actually, I don’t think that’s such a bad idea.  I’m not saying forget such events like the 2008 invasion of Georgia or the probable 2007 Russian cyber attack against Estonia; but, if we truly want to hit the “reset” button with that nation, NATO membership should be considered as an option.

There was one other item concerning the Russian military that jumped out at me this week.  The Russians announced they will be modernizing their maintenance and supply site in Tartus, Syria.  The port was a major part of the Soviet Navy support system during the Cold War and has fallen into disrepair.  Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky stated, “Tartus will be developed as a naval base and modernization will be completed in 2012”.  The intent is to have it serve as a base for cruisers and possibly aircraft carriers. 

This is part of the announced Russian plan to rebuild their Navy.  During the Soviet era, their Navy was one of the most powerful in the world.  Russia also maintains its Black Sea Fleet in the Ukraine and has signed an agreement with that nation “extending the lease on the Sevatopol base for 25 years after the current lease expires in 2017” (http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100609/159359739.html).  I’m sure I’ll be blogging more about this in the future. 

The Pacific region continues to be interesting.  Yesterday, South Korea announced they will be conducting a five day anti submarine exercise in the Yellow Sea (http://app.yonhapnews.co.kr/YNA/Basic/Article/Print/YIBW_showEnArticlePrintView.aspx?contents_id=AEN20100803008100315).  The “drill will involve 10 ships including a 4,500 ton destroyer and a 1,800-ton submarine, as well as KF-15/16 fighter jets and anti-submarine aircraft”. 

North Korea is doing their usual trash talk threatening a “physical retaliation”  http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm).  Last week they were threatening a nuclear retaliation against the joint U.S. / South Korean exercise in the Sea of Japan.  This week’s threat is toned down a notch.   No word on if any U.S. units will participate in the exercise.  The next scheduled joint U.S./South Korea exercise is Ulchi Freedom Guardian 2010 (UFG 10).  The U.S. commander in the region, General Walter Sharp, stated, “UFG 10 is the first exercise since President Lee and President Obama announced the decision to delay the transition of wartime operational control until late 2015.  UFG 10 represents an excellent opportunity to develop the tenets of our Strategic Alliance 2015 plans as we improve ROK/U.S. combat readiness and joint/combined interoperability” (http://www.usfk.mil/usfk/Uploads/100/SharpPoint21-10UlchiFreedomGuardian10.pdf).

China is conducting a five day airborne exercise called Vanguard 2010 in a region which borders the Yellow Sea.  A BBC news report quoted a Chinese army run Military weekly newspaper which “said the exercises though ‘low key’, carried a message. ‘If other people threaten our interests, we have enough military means and technological methods to keep them in check,’ the newspaper said”.  As mentioned in an earlier blog, China has protested recent U.S./South Korean exercises in the region.  It’s getting really interesting.

That about does it for me.  I volunteer at the local college radio station.  Have to head out now to do a radio show.  As always my views are my own.  I’ll be writing a blog finishing up my series on the Afghanistan COIN strategy in the next few days.
    

This is the second blog I’m writing on insights gained during my participation in a series of three bloggers roundtables sponsored by the Department of Defense.  On July 21, 2010, I had the opportunity to interview Capt A. Heather Coyne the Community and NGO liaison officer for NATO Training Mission Afghanistan.  The job is a new position which Capt Coyne states was developed “to ensure that civil society can play a role in shaping the training and reform of the security forces, especially the police”.  The groups she’s focusing on include “human rights organizations, business and professional organizations, even student unions and religious groups”.

Capt Coyne indicates one of her highest priorities is creating public confidence in the Afghan police force.  She indicates:  “in Afghanistan, the police have always been about protecting the state, not the people.  They just don’t have a history or a mindset of protect and serve…The NATO training mission has been working to improve that professionalization and training so that we’re putting better police on the street, but we’re also now looking at this from the other side, how the public interacts with their police and how citizens can play a role in making police accountable and responsive to communities”.

Capt Coyne was encouraged when she arrived to find that Afghan civil organizations had already begun work in these areas training police on issues such as domestic violence and human rights.  International NGOs were helping improve community relations with the police.  Capt Coyne says there are several hundred international NGOs and a couple of thousand Afghan NGOs.  She sees NATO’s role as strengthening and expanding those efforts.  She’s focusing her efforts on three areas:  increasing NGO involvement in police training on human and civil rights, importance of consulting with the community members, and show people police are there to serve and protect.  This would involve having police conduct training on issues like safety in schools, first aid, fire prevention, etc.

Capt Coyne says, “ My usual advance to NGOs is to find out…what is it that you’re doing, what are your goals and are we doing anything that’s getting in your way, so that we can get out of your way and let you do your missions”.  Ultimately one of her goals is to get them to the point where they might start making suggestions on improving NATO training of Afghan forces.

When asked about reports of corruption in the Afghan police force, she indicated it was not that the people in the Afghan communities were not aware of and concerned about corruption, they believe its morally wrong; but were more concerned about things that affected their daily lives and “how police relate to them in their day-to-day lives”.  One  NATO effort involved training Afghan police on how to present IED awareness safety training for children.  The first day the police gave the training 100 children showed up, the second time 500 children showed up; a small step but a vital one in a long journey to build public trust.

Another effort involves bringing more women into the Afghan police force.  There are currently about 1,000 women on the force serving primarily in family response units which deal primarily with domestic abuse, rape and other crimes committed against women.  The target goal is to have 5,000 women police and to eventually have them also working in areas like election security.

The bottom line on all of this according to Capt Coyne is:  “When people trust their police, they’ll be more willing to share intelligence about the bad guys, and when people feel that their security forces and their government are there to protect and serve, not to extort and abuse, they’ll be less likely to turn to insurgency in the first place”.

I think for the sake of time, I’ll save the third interview I participated in for my next blog.  I think this is an important topic and the roundtables were an excellent forum to provide better insight into an area of the COIN strategy that has been thus far poorly covered in the media.  I still have major concerns over what will happen after the NATO troops leave.  I am much encouraged that the majority of NGOs working the issues are Afghan and not international.  Lasting change has to come from the Afghan people.  Long lasting change must come from within.

I use an example from our own past as an example.  In the aftermath of the Civil War, as long as the Union troops remained in the south, reconstruction of institutions designed to enslave a large segment of the southern population were not allowed to flourish.  After the troops left, southern states used Jim Crow laws and repressive social norms to basically develop a form of legalized slavery and oppressive discrimination.  The problem was not resolved until the modern day civil rights movement.  The government’s reconstruction policy could not change the attitudes of the majority of the population.  As I mentioned in my last blog on this topic, I wonder how deeply rooted are the changes?  As I said before, we won’t know until after the NATO forces leave but they are certainly giving it their all.

Again my views are my own.  Think I’ll try to get a bike ride in before it rains.   

Last week I had the opportunity to participate in three separate Bloggers roundtables on Afghanistan sponsored by the Department of Defense (DoD).  The roundtables were a forum designed to provide access to key officials involved in NATO’s training of Afghan Police and Army forces.  Participating via a teleconferences from Afghanistan were Dr. Jack Kem, deputy to the commander of NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, Capt. A. Heather Coyne, NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) Community Liaison Officer, and Sergeant Major Michael Logan, USMC, NTM-A.  This is the first of two blogs I plan to write on the event.

I blogged about the COIN strategy manual (http://www.usgcoin.org/library/doctrine/COIN-FM3-24.pdf)  a couple of weeks ago but to better put the roundtables into perspective I’d like to do a brief review of some key points related to the importance of the training.  First off as stated in the manual “Military efforts are necessary and important to counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts, but they are only effective when integrated into a comprehensive strategy employing all instruments of national power”.  The manual also stated there were three stages to a COIN campaign and used a medical analogy to clarify.  The initial stage was to stop the bleeding; the middle was characterized as inpatient recovery, and the third outpatient care – movement to self-sufficiency.

As I understand the process, the training discussed during the round table discussions is part of the second stage.  The characteristics of this stage are taken directly from the COIN manual and are as follows: 

MIDDLE STAGE: “INPATIENT CARE—RECOVERY”

•         Characterized by efforts aimed at assisting the patient through long-term recovery or restoration of health—which in this case means achieving stability and civil security.

•         The desire in this stage is to develop and build resident capability and capacity in the Host Nation (HN) government and security forces.

•          Focus expands to include governance, provision of essential services, and stimulation of economic development.

•         Relationships with HN counterparts in the government and security forces and with the local populace are developed and strengthened.

•         The host nation increases its legitimacy through providing security, expanding effective governance, providing essential services, and achieving incremental success in meeting public expectations.

The manual gives one major caveat associated with this training:  “The Host Nation Doing Something Tolerably Is Normally Better than Us Doing It Well” It is just as important to consider who performs an operation as to assess how well it is done. Where the United States is supporting a host nation, long-term success requires establishing viable HN leaders and institutions that can carry on without significant U.S. support. The longer that process takes, the more U.S. public support will wane and the more the local populace will question the legitimacy of their own forces and government”.

With that as a background, I’d like to go over some of the key points of the first roundtable conducted with Sergeant Major Michael Logan, USMC, NTM-A on July 20, 2010 on efforts to train the Afghan Army.  According to Sergeant Major Logan currently they have trained approximately 130,000 soldiers.  They expect that number to rise to 134,000 by the end of the month.  Of that number there are 33,000 non commissioned officers (NCOs).  Logan indicated this training was accomplished with 1,228 coalition trainers and 4,600 Afghan trainers.  They have been conducting a train the trainer program in order to enable the Afghans to sustain the effort after the NATO trainers are gone.

Another major emphasis in training is to develop a strong NCO corp.  Sergeant Major Logan mentioned under the old ways of doing things in the Afghan Army “the officers did more of the day-to-day leading and the NCOs were more of a general population. As we developed the NCOs, we forced them to take more ownership and control of their troops.”  Logan emphasized that NCOs are the backbone of US military forces and he believes they will also be the backbone of the Afghan forces.

When asked, what is the biggest misperception about the training as portrayed in the media”, Logan mentioned coverage of the literacy issue.  He admits that is an issue but great strides have been made during the 9 months they’ve been conducting the training.  Originally, when the program began in November 2009, the requirement to enter the program was a third grade third grade reading level.  Logan indicates people have actually progressed up to the fifth grade reading level after about six months of training.  Today he says there are 11,700 enrolled in the literacy program and 6,400 graduates. 

There are other challenges.  Logan states “leader development has outpaced the accelerated force generation”. 

When asked about press reports of corruption in the Afghan forces, Logan states:  “Within the training realm, things we’ve done to professionalize the army, like developing systems and institutions to professionalize the growth of the force; standardizing training; development of leaders, so that when they come in and they’re looking at the example that they have and the things that we put them through, I know that that’s affecting them on the outside.  So within the ranks, I’m confident we’re making a difference.”

I see a couple of challenges.  First off with the large numbers of the Afghan Army fresh out of training how effective will their force be against the seasoned fighters of the Taliban?  Second how deep are the roots of the leadership training they’re receiving?  We won’t know the answers to those questions until NATO forces depart but one thing I know for sure, they’re receiving some of the best training in the world.

Well that’s it for now.  Will summarize the remaining two roundtables in the next couple of days.  As Always my views are my own.      

It’s been a tough few days for the U.S. Intelligence community.  Last week the Washington Post ran a series called “Top Secret America” and this week the media is filled with stories of 92,000 classified documents released by some web site.  The documents cover events in Afghanistan from 2004 – 2009.  I’ve blogged before about the lack of understanding of how the intelligence community works by both the media and many government officials.  This is just the latest example.

The reports are all well researched and well written; but these latest reports seem aimed more to titillate rather than educate the public.  Take one of the New York Times article on the classified documents titled:  View is Bleaker Than Official Portrayal of War in Afghanistan (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/world/asia/26warlogs.html).  Here’s the opening paragraph:  “A six-year archive of classified military documents made public on Sunday offers an unvarnished, ground-level picture of the war in Afghanistan that is in many respects more grim than the official portrayal”.  My first thought when I read it is “Oh no, here’s another Pentagon Papers thing”.   Then you go down a few paragraphs and you see:  “Over all, the documents do not contradict official accounts of the war. But in some cases the documents show that the American military made misleading public statements — attributing the downing of a helicopter to conventional weapons instead of heat-seeking missiles or giving Afghans credit for missions carried out by Special Operations commandos”.

I hold no security clearances and only have access to information provided by the media, official government statements and congressional testimony.  I so far have not been surprised by any of the content gleaned from the classified documents.  I think there is also the question of terminology.  I consider a hand held surface to air missile and its launcher a conventional weapon.  In terms of threats and how can the enemy hurt you these weapons are always mentioned in studies and reports I’ve read.  The fact that we have not had a large number of aircraft, particularly helicopters shot down tells me the bad guys don’t have a lot of these weapons.

The Washington Post series of articles last week had a lot of interesting facts but the data was not put into context.  Of course the size of the intelligence community has grown.  We are a nation at war and not just with the terrorists.  As mentioned in earlier blogs we are also under cyber attack.  Part of the community build up is in response to that threat.  At a recent conference Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn stated the following:  “DoD has a large IT footprint.  We operate more than 15,000 networks within the .mil domain.  We have seven million computing devices…The threat to our computer networks is substantial.  They are scanned millions of times a day.  They are probed thousands of times a day.  And we have not always been successful in stopping intrusions.  In fact, over the past several years, we have experienced damaging penetrations”. (http://www.stratcom.mil/speeches/38/2010_Cyberspace_Symposium_Keynote__DoD_Perspective)  Terrorism and cyber represent just two of many threats the intelligence community has to keep track of.

The Washington Post article also goes on and on about the large number of people who have security clearances.  They say it’s an estimated 854,000.  I don’t question the numbers but they really don’t explain why.  If you’re going to work with the intelligence community you have to have security clearances.  If you don’t have clearances you don’t have access to much of the available information.  In many instances without clearances you can’t even get into the intelligence buildings for meetings and such. Because of the war you needed to ensure as many people as needed had clearances so they could have access to the information.  You cannot provide solutions if you can’t look at all of the data.  All of these new people can’t fit into existing facilities so you have to find new work spaces for them.  In the intelligence communities they’re called SCIFs.  The article gave the impression that more SCIFs than needed were being built and they were worthless symbols of importance or something.

The Post article also talks about the large amount of data and redundancy of reporting.  Let’s look first at the data.  I’ve blogged about this before.  One of the major criticisms of the intelligence community is lack of coordination and sharing of data.  One of the major reasons for the information overload is caused because the various intelligence communities are sharing information and have been long before 9/11.  Ironically sharing of data is part of the problem.  In a 2007 article in Foreign Affairs magazine, the Director of National Intelligence said every 24 hours the intelligence community collected one billion pieces of information.  I’m sure that amount has increased.

The intelligence community is putting a lot of time and effort into solving this problem.  Maryann Lawlor has written an excellent article called Googlizing Intelligence in the June issue of Signal Magazine (http://online.qmags.com/SGNL0710/). 

There is redundancy of reporting but not in the way the article suggests.  Each major command and/or organization has an intelligence staff that provides daily reports of key events in their area much like newspaper and TV media news reports.  The reports are tailored for their audience.  A military commander of a major geographic region has different information requirements from a young man or woman operating in a combat zone.   These various reports are made available to the other intelligence and military commands for purposes of sharing and collaboration.

All of this is not to say there are not problems within the intelligence community.  There are many and they have been very open about this.  They have even held conferences and reached out to industry and academia for help but these events get very little play in the media.  Guess these efforts aren’t publicized because they don’t fall in the “if it bleeds, its leads” category the media seems to love these days.

Well that’s it for me.  As always my views are my own.  Think I’ll go for a bike ride.

Relations between North and South Korea (ROK) continue to simmer in the aftermath of the sinking of the South Korean warship, Chenoan, in which 46 sailors lost their lives.  This week during a visit to South Korea, Secretary of State Clinton announced new sanctions against North Korea targeted at sale and purchase of arms and import of luxury goods. On 22 July, the Defense Chiefs of the United States and South Korea announced that the two nations will conduct an exercise called Invincible Spirit July 25 – 28.

The exercise is the first in a series of combined air and naval exercises that will be held off both the east and west coasts of South Korea.  On the official web site for U.S. forces in Korea, the commander General Walter Sharp stated:  “These defensive, combined training exercises are designed to send a clear message to North Korea that its aggressive behavior must stop, and that the ROK and U.S. are committed to enhancing our combined defensive capabilities.”  General Sharp indicated the exercise will include over 200 aircraft, the U.S. aircraft carrier USS George Washington and ROK Naval Ship Dokdo.

U.S. and ROK joint military exercises are nothing new and have been conducted frequently over the years.  What is interesting about this exercise are the usual objections from North Korea and particularly China seem far more intense than I can remember.  According to a BBC press report, today while attending a Association of South East Asian Nations conference, North Korea’s representative Ri Tong-il, called the exercise an example of 19^th Century gunboat diplomacy and said North Korea would have a “physical response” to the exercise.  Of note, Secretary of State Clinton is also attending the conference and thus far there are no reports on her response to the statement.

I’m not sure what North Korea means by “physical response” but suspect they may do something with some of their military forces.  In the Cold War days, when one side exercised its military forces, the other side sent military units to monitor the activity.  That usually included things like deploying navy ships and aircraft.  With North Korea who knows, it could be that or they could start lobbing missiles over the pacific for “tests”. 

China appears to be flexing its pacific naval muscle with an attitude of “there’s a new sheriff in town”. According to a 20 July report in the New York Times “Gen. Ma Xiaotian, deputy chief of the general staff of the People’s Liberation Army, said that China ‘strongly opposed’ the exercises.’”

On July 16^th the Chinese People’s Daily published an article (http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90780/91342/7069743.html#) where Major General Luo Yuan, deputy secretary general with the PLA Academy of Military Sciences stated five reasons behind China’s opposition to the exercises.  Because of the importance of understanding the Chinese perspective here’s an excerpt of the article: 

First, in terms of security, Chairman Mao Zedong once said, “We will never allow others to keep snoring beside our beds.” If the United States were in China’s shoes, would it allow China to stage military exercises near its western and eastern coasts? Just like an old Chinese saying goes, “Do not do unto others what you do not want others to do unto you,” if the United States does not wish to be treated in a specific way, it should not forcefully sell the way to others.

Second, in terms of strategic thinking, China should take into account the worst possibility and strive to seek the best results. The bottom line of strategic thinking is to nip the evil in the bud. The ultimate level of strategic thinking is to subdue the enemy without fighting. Preventing crisis is the best way to resolve and overcome the crisis. China’s current tough stance is part of preventive diplomacy.

Third, in terms of geopolitical strategy, the Yellow Sea is the gateway to China’s capital region and a vital passage to the heartland of Beijing and Tianjin. In history, foreign invaders repeatedly took the Yellow Sea as an entrance to enter the heartland of Beijing and Tianjin. The drill area selected by the United States and South Korea is only 500 kilometers away from Beijing. China will be aware of the security pressure from military exercises conducted by any country in an area that is so close to China’s heartland.

The aircraft carrier U.S.S. George Washington dispatched to the Yellow Sea has a combat radius of 600 kilometers and its aircraft has a combat radius as long as 1,000 kilometers. Therefore, the military exercise in the area has posed a direct security threat to China’s heartland and the Bohai Rim Economic Circle.

Fourth, in a bid to safeguard security on the Korean Peninsula, the U. N. Security Council has just issued a presidential statement, requiring all parties to remain calm and restrained to the so-called “Cheonan” naval ship incident, which had caused a major crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

On the other hand, the joint military exercise by the United States and South Korea on the Yellow Sea has created a new crisis. This is another reason why China strongly opposes the military exercise on the Yellow Sea. In order to safeguard security on the Korea Peninsula, no country should create a new crisis instead they should control and deal with the existing one.

Fifth, in terms of maintaining China-U.S. relations, especially the two parties’ military relations, China must declare its solemn stance. China has been working to promote the healthy development of China-U.S. military relations. Therefore, China has clearly declared that it is willing to promote the development of the two parties’ relations. Deputy Director of the General Staff Gen. Ma Xiaotian has also expressed his welcome to U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates to visit China at a proper time.

It’s interesting that the Chinese objections seem to zero in on exercises in the Yellow Sea.  The New York Times reports that “as recently as last October, the George Washington participated in naval exercises in the Yellow Sea with South Korea.”  Thus far official U.S. announcements on the joint exercises have indicated they would be held off of both Korea’s east and west coast.  It’s unclear at this time if the George Washington will operate in the Yellow Sea for exercises.

I think China has decided this is a good opportunity to flex their naval muscle on the world stage with a highly visible challenge to U.S. Pacific Fleet assets.  As I understand it, Chinese strategists believe in order to protect their economic development they must maintain the security of their sea lines of communication.  That requires a navy capable of operating well beyond coastal waters.  According to an unclassified Naval Intelligence study “many Chinese Scholars and PLA(N) strategists now advocate a new strategy for the 21^st century, termed ‘distant sea defense.’  This new strategy would not bound operations geographically, but rather be defined according to China’s maritime needs. (Office of Naval Intelligence, The People’s Liberation Army Navy A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics ( Suitland, MD, August 2009), pg. 6, accessed at http://www.nmic.navy.mil/Intelligence_Community/docs/china_army_navy.pdf)”.

Finally, I would not count out the Russian Navy in terms of who are the regional navy powers.  Russia recently conducted a major naval exercise in the Pacific called Vostok 2010.  During the Cold War, the former Soviet Union had one of the largest navy’s in the world.  It took a major hit after the Cold War and was left as a shadow of its old self but it looks like Russia is building it up again.

Well that does it for now.  I was going for a bike ride but its raining so think I’ll do a face plant on my couch.  I’ll be watching this Korean exercise situation with interest.  Have a couple of other topics I intend to blog on next week like the Washington Post article trashing the U.S. intelligence community and more on Afghanistan’s COIN strategy.  I was given the honor this week of speaking directly to some of the individuals involved in training the Afghanistan Army and Police.  Got lots of good data I’d like to pass on.  Have a good weekend.  As always, my opinions are my own.     

According to a just released ABC news report, U.S. public support for the war in Afghanistan has dropped from 52% in December to 43% today.  The Taliban must be rejoicing because this shows, at least for the moment that their strategy is working.  The bottom line is the Taliban knows they can’t beat U.S. forces in a conventional type war; consequently a major part of their strategy is fought using the media.  History shows raise the body count in a conflict and the U.S. public will to continue declines.

This is not necessarily an all bad trait; for history also shows the U.S. public to be among the most caring compassionate people in the world.  Our response to world disasters is unmatched.  Take the Black Hawk down incident in Somalia in the 1990’s.  Many forget our forces were actually in Somalia on a humanitarian mission.  Thousands were starving; there was no infrastructure to move food and supplies to the people who needed them.  U.S. forces were sent in to help.

In a second ABC news report the director of the Afghanistan Rights Monitor, Ajmal Samadi, was quoted as saying: “Insurgents are certainly carrying out more attacks across the country than at any time before”.  There were over 1,200 violent incidents in June, the most in a single month since 2002.  The report goes on to state:  “Violence has soared as coalition forces, bolstered by 30,000 American reinforcements, move into Taliban strongholds in the south and east to try to wrest the areas from the militants, strengthen Afghan government control and win Afghans’ trust.  The insurgents have responded with a wave of ambushes, suicide attacks, roadside bombs and assassinations.”

To help put current events into context it might be useful to give a brief review of the COIN strategy itself. I talked about it in my last blog but think one section is particularly informative.  According to the COIN manual, the conflict goes through 3 stages.  To better illustrate the maual uses a medical analogy.  The following is a condensed version from the manual:

INITIAL STAGE: “STOP THE BLEEDING”

•         Initially, COIN operations are similar to emergency first aid for the patient. The goal is to protect the population, break the insurgents’ initiative and momentum, and set the conditions for further engagement.

•         Limited offensive operations may be undertaken, but are complemented by stability operations focused on civil security.

•          During this stage, friendly and enemy information needed to complete the common operational picture is collected and initial running estimates are developed.

•          Counterinsurgents also begin shaping the information environment, including the expectations of the local populace.

MIDDLE STAGE: “INPATIENT CARE—RECOVERY”

•         Characterized by efforts aimed at assisting the patient through long-term recovery or restoration of health—which in this case means achieving stability and civil security.

•         The desire in this stage is to develop and build resident capability and capacity in the HN government and security forces.

•          Focus expands to include governance, provision of essential services, and stimulation of economic development.

•         Relationships with HN counterparts in the government and security forces and with the local populace are developed and strengthened.

•         The host nation increases its legitimacy through providing security, expanding effective governance, providing essential services, and achieving incremental success in meeting public expectations.

“OUTPATIENT CARE—MOVEMENT TO SELF-SUFFICIENCY”

•         Stage three is characterized by the expansion of stability operations across contested regions, ideally using HN forces.

•          The main goal for this stage is to transition responsibility for COIN operations to HN leadership.

•         The multinational force works with the host nation in an increasingly supporting role, turning over responsibility wherever and whenever appropriate.

It would seem to me we are in the first stage.  A counterinsurgency campaign is one of the most difficult conflicts to wage.  The war in Afghanistan is just one front of a global terrorism war.  One thing the public needs to be aware of is media reporting on the war is incomplete.  The media does not have access to all of the information.  The nature of war involves concealing as much of your intentions as possible.  The other thing the public needs to be aware of is just because something is written in the COIN manual doesn’t mean the military will stick with a concept that is not working.  One theme that goes throughout the manual is the need to constantly evaluate whether something is working and make rapid changes as needed.

Well that’s it for now.  As always my thoughts are my own.  Think I’ll go for a bike ride before it gets too hot!

I had one of the best 4th of July weekends ever. I got to go on long scenic bike rides with friends, hang out at barbeques, and top off the weekend experience by watching a fireworks show which for reasons unknown to me was paid for by BP. Go figure. In spite of the fun, my thoughts kept drifting off to Afghanistan and the task facing General Petraeus as he assumed command of U.S. and International Security Forces (ISAF) in the region. During the weekend the media covered the remarks he made on his assumption of command like “we are in this to win”. They also reiterated that he was the co-author of the Counterinsurgency Strategy (COIN). During the next week most coverage of Afghanistan continued to focus only on the number of people killed. There were very few details provided.

Yesterday an ABC news report quoted a NATO official stating the insurgents were not gaining the upper hand and there was no need to postpone elections scheduled for September. In the next sentence the report goes on to state: “Saturday was a particularly bloody day, with six U.S. soldiers killed in separate incidents and more than a dozen civilians –including 12 gunned down in a bus near Afghanistan’s eastern border with Pakistan.” I’m not beating up on ABC news; in fact they’re one of my favorite news sources but where is the context? What is U.S. strategy in Afghanistan? Since this is going to be one of the major issues in our upcoming elections shouldn’t we try to gain a more thorough understanding of the issues and strategy before voting?

In all of the recent coverage I’ve not seen any description in the media of exactly what the COIN is other than to “win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people” and less than subtle hints that the strategy in Afghanistan won’t succeed. I believe this is too important an issue to be covered in “sound bites”; consequently, I thought it might be useful to review the document. It was published in December 2006 and is named Counterinsurgency Field Manuel No. 3-24. I plan on devoting at least two blogs on this topic.

I first read the manual in the fall of 2006 when it was being circulated in rough draft form. My thoughts at the time were it was one of the best and most informative documents I’d ever read on the subject. I reread it this weekend, all 282 pages of it. It’s actually a pretty easy read. When I did my graduate work in International Studies, one of my major complaints was most of the books they had us read for our courses took hundreds of pages to make points that could have been made in 50 pages or less. In spite of the length its concise but thorough.

The COIN manual has seven chapters:
- Insurgency and Counterinsurgency
- Unity of Effort
- Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Campaigns and Operations
- Executing Counterinsurgency Operations
- Developing Host Nation Security Forces
- Leadership and Ethics for Counterinsurgency
- Sustainment

There were several points that jumped out at me. The first is definitions, what are we talking about? The manual defines insurgency as “an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control. Counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”

The second point of interest: “One common feature of insurgencies is that the government that is being targeted generally takes awhile to recognize that an insurgency is occurring. Insurgents take advantage of that time to build strength and gather support. Thus, counterinsurgents often have to ‘come from behind’ when fighting an insurgency. Another common feature is that forces conducting COIN operations usually begin poorly. Western militaries too often neglect the study of insurgency. They falsely believe that armies trained to win large conventional wars are automatically prepared to win small, unconventional ones. In fact, some capabilities required for conventional success—for example, the ability to execute operational maneuver and employ massive firepower—may be of limited utility or even counterproductive in COIN operations. Nonetheless, conventional forces beginning COIN operations often try to use these capabilities to defeat insurgents; they almost always fail.”

This is particularly relevant when considering the debate over the restricted use of close air support to ground troops in Afghanistan. There have been reports that some of the troops were unhappy with the rules of engagement. Initial reports indicate General Petraeus will keep the current rules in place. It is worth noting that throughout the COIN Manual repeatedly stresses the importance of constantly checking and revising strategy.

A third item of interest: “Political power is the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate. Insurgents use all available tools—political (including diplomatic), informational (including appeals to religious, ethnic, or ideological beliefs), military, and economic—to overthrow the existing authority. This authority may be an established government or an interim governing body. Counterinsurgents, in turn, use all instruments of national power to sustain the established or emerging government and reduce the likelihood of another crisis emerging. Long-term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government’s rule. Achieving this condition requires the government to eliminate as many causes of the insurgency as feasible. This can include eliminating those extremists whose beliefs prevent them from ever reconciling with the government. Over time, counterinsurgents aim to enable a country or regime to provide the security and rule of law that allow establishment of social services and growth of economic activity. COIN thus involves the application of national power in the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure fields and disciplines. Political and military leaders and planners
should never underestimate its scale and complexity; moreover, they should recognize that the Armed Forces cannot succeed in COIN alone.”

This to me addresses the “unity of effort” point being made by General Petraeus in his speeches. It’s not just a military problem. It also explains the importance being placed on training Afghanistan security forces. A major problem will be whether the Afghanistan people consider their current government “legitimate” or an impotent figurehead thing.

Think I’ll stop here. As always my views are my own. I’m just a retired Baby Boomer trying to live happily ever after in the Colorado Rockies. Guess I’ll go for a bike ride but will probably never be able to forget my time as part of the Central Command Staff. I was assigned to the Naval component in the ‘90’s. We were in a constant crisis mode because of Saddam. I know from first hand experience how hard the men are woman are working and can’t help but feel a little guilty of being able to relax in a safe, secure environment while they are in harms way. My body may be in the Rockies but my heart is with the troops. This does not mean I blindly accept our security strategy only that I hope to bring clarity to the issues for interested readers.