U.S. Defense

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles are a family of armored fighting vehicles designed to survive IED attacks and ambushes in Iraq and Afghanistan. In an article called “Hopes for Vehicle Questioned After Iraq Blast,” the New York Times described the first loss of a soldier in a MRAP. However, this soldier was a turret gunner and was mostly outside of the vehicle when the explosion hit it. Did he die of fragmentation or did the vehicle roll over on him? The cause of death isn’t clear. The other three soldiers actually inside the vehicle survived with minor injuries. An obvious conclusion would be that the vehicle’s skin saved them and that MRAPs work. Until we learn the cause of death of the turret gunner and where exactly the IED went off in relation to the vehicle, we can’t make a completely accurate assessment of the survivability of the MRAP in real combat conditions and not a controlled environment like in Army tests.

The MRAP is not without other problems as one critic notes: it’s big and heavy, which limits its mobility, especially in urban terrain, and it can’t be towed by a similiar vehicle. It’s height is also a liability in urban terrain as it becomes an easy target for armor hunting insurgents. Speed and mobility is being traded for brute force protection. The problem is that if you have the speed you probably don’t need the protection, but if you are slow and heavy, you better have all the protection you need. There is a Navy saying that “Speed is life,” which may be applicable to the MRAP.

All of this leads to questions about the effectiveness of the MRAP, but even if it performs as advertised it still is just a tactical solution to a strategic problem. It is a tactical question to ask, can a MRAP survive an IED hit, but a better, more strategic question is, why are Iraqis planting IEDs to hit MRAPs? The MRAP is merely a stopgap measure to lower the body count of American dead and pre-empt the American people from asking that strategic question.

America is already operating in Pakistan covertly, with CIA and Special Forces on the ground and Predator drones in the air. However, whether the US Army itself will cross the border and cut off the insurgent sanctuary as it did in Cambodia in 1970, remains to be seen. President Musharraf has repeatedly warned Bush about the consequences of Americans violating Pakistan’s sovereignty and taking on the tribal areas themselves saying, “the man in the street will not allow this — he will come out and agitate.” So, an increased presence of Americans risks playing into the hands of Al Qaeda’s propaganda, and increasing the ire of regular Pakistanis, but not to use US forces risks not achieving important military goals.

The New York Times reports that “the top two American intelligence officials traveled secretly to Pakistan early this month to press President Musharraf to allow the CIA greater latitude to operate in the tribal territories where Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other militant groups are all active.” Although Musharraf has denied the US unilateral means to operate inside Pakistan, he will allow better coordination of joint activities. This includes sharing of actionable intelligence so Pakistani forces can do the actual mission and increasing the number and scope of missions by armed Predator surveillance aircraft. Does this mean US operators have the power to attack with the Predators on their own volition or will they have to seek permission from the Pakistanis? These rules of engagement and the speed of decision will mean the difference between a successful hit and a target that gets away.

UPDATE: The Asia Times reports that the US has completed construction and made operational ”a military base in Afghanistan’s Kunar province, just three kilometers from Bajaur Agency in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The new US base is expected to serve as the center of clandestine special forces’ operations in the border region.”

MSNBC cites a report from a research group “that nearly 71 percent of Army recruits graduated from high school in the 2007 budget year.” MSN goes on to state that “the Army’s goal is 90 percent high school graduates, which it hasn’t met since 2004. Each year since, the number of recruits with at least a high school diploma has steadily declined.”

In a conventional war, soldiers don’t need to be critical thinkers, strength and guts is usually enough to win through to victory. However, counter-insurgency is a thinking man’s war. The enemy has to be outthought as much as outfought. Often, knowing when not to shoot is as important as engaging, which takes discipline born from intelligence, maturity and selflessness. Also, fighting an insurgency is more ambigious than fighting an interstate war between uniformed armies. The soldiers involved do not have clear military objectives that can be attained by applying the right amount of force at the right place. There will be no liberation and joyous people thanking the soldiers. Instead, there will be indifference at best and resistance at worst. This also will prey on those without the mental agility to deal with this aspect of their role as occupiers.

Now, because of its losses, the Army has to lower its standards in order to put more soldiers in the field. The same situation existed in Vietnam during the last few years of US involvment. The officer corps lowered its standards and allowed its cadets to go through a quick leadership program, which came to be derisively called “shake and bake.” Lieutenant Calley of My Lai infamy became an officer through this program.

I’m not saying anything so heinous will occur in Iraq because of relaxed standards, but there will be a slow, grinding price to pay. The new soldiers will have less discipline, which will lead to more casualties and more deadly errors. In turn, this will lead to greater resistance among the Iraqi population, which translates into more US casualties and an even more urgent need to replace them. The longer the occupation goes on, the lower the recruitment standards will fall. The Army is caught in a vicious circle.

Recently, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates criticized NATO troops in Afghanistan for not understanding how to fight a counter-insurgency campaign. Now that 3,200 US Marines will be deploying to the country, Gates is saying they are there to help the overall war effort and the move is not intended to be a statement about NATO’s efforts. However, the Marines are considered to be the most experienced branch at counter-insurgency within the US military and 1,000 of them will deploy as trainers.