U.S. Defense

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are largely being fought by conventional military forces. However, America is also engaged in low intensity conflicts in other countries, mostly using US Army Special Forces (SF).  

One conflict we have been heavily engaged in over the years is the 40 year long people’s war in Colombia. The FARC rebels have been one of the most effective guerrilla armies in history. They have consistently been able to defend themselves from the more numerous and better equipped government security forces. They have even launched successful attacks of their own. All of this despite US aid to the Colombian military of over 600 million a year as part of Plan Colombia. And in addition to all the money, we also give them Black Hawk and OH-6 helicopters. 

America’s secret war against the FARC is being fought mostly by the US Army 7^th Special Forces Group who are training the Colombian army in counter-drug and counter-insurgency tactics. Although it is officially denied, the SF “advisors” are probably fighting alongside the Colombians as well. However, the Department of Defense does not want to risk casualties too often, so the SF element is complemented with security contractors such as Dyncorp and Air Scan that spray the herbicide, conduct the air surveillance and mark targets for the Colombian army. 

Like I said, despite this massive influx of military power, the FARC have more than held their own, until recently. The BBC is today reporting that the founder of FARC, Manuel Marulanda, has died of a heart attack in the jungle. If this is true, it could be the final nail in the coffin of the FARC as it has suffered major setbacks. Just two months ago, Raul Reyes, one of the most senior commanders of FARC was killed in an air strike and the group’s dwindling numbers attest to the fact that FARC is in decline. Perhaps like Sendero Luminoso, they may be defeated as a revolutionary organization, but will continue as a drug cartel.  

The role of America in FARC’s decline can be instructive to the “War on Terror” operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US kept its role in Colombia limited to Special Forces advisory efforts and allowing the country’s own security forces to conduct military operations. Even with a small US component, indigenous security efforts, and massive aid, the counter-insurgency program has taken over twenty years to come to the point where the FARC is in noticeable decline and its leaders are being killed or captured. However, it could be just as true to say, the FARC had been winning this campaign the whole time since it took the Colombian military with US backing over twenty years to bring it to this point.

We are fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the opposite way. We are using conventional forces to conduct large scale operations with little help from the indigenous security forces, or at least, very ineffective help. If we keep going this way, we will be fighting these two wars for the next twenty years like we did in Colombia, but with a lot less to show for it.

     General Ricardo Sanchez, the former commander of coalition forces in Iraq, has belittled the service of Bernard Kerik for failing to produce results while Kerik was the interim minister of interior of Iraq in 2003. In that position, Kerik was supposed to oversee the rebuilding of the National Police, the Intelligence Service and the Border and Customs Police. None of which have performed their jobs effectively. Thus one of the most important positions in Iraq in 2003 was squandered while the resistance movement grew.      

     The goal of an occupation is to gradually turn military operations into police operations and a militarized state into one of civilian control based on law and order. Therefore, fielding a viable police force with political legitimacy amongst its own people should be the first priority of any occupation. Indigenous people are more likely to support security forces from their own country rather than foreigners with alien values and beliefs. Without an indigenous police force, the occupying soldiers have to conduct the necessary police operations, which they are ill-equipped culturally to do.          

     In a guerrilla war, there is a constant struggle between the occupier and the insurgents for the allegiance of the people. If the insurgent is seen as a genuine resistance fighter, his presence will be concealed from the occupiers and no intelligence on his activities will be forthcoming. The goal of the occupiers is to erase the perception of the insurgent as a heroic resistance fighter and instead make it clear that attacking the security forces is a crime and the resistance is not heroic, but criminal. Once the resistance fighter is seen as a criminal, then actionable intelligence will be given to the security forces         

     Ultimately, capturing insurgents should be a matter of local Iraqi police forces picking up wanted criminals. We shouldn’t be seeing US forces conducting house to house searches, roadblocks, checkpoints or protecting VIPs. Every “police” operation our combat forces engage in is another example of how we have failed to accomplish our most important mission in Iraq: building up the Iraqi police and army so they can effectively take the place of the foreigners with alien values and beliefs.