General Ricardo Sanchez, the former commander of coalition forces in Iraq, has belittled the service of Bernard Kerik for failing to produce results while Kerik was the interim minister of interior of Iraq in 2003. In that position, Kerik was supposed to oversee the rebuilding of the National Police, the Intelligence Service and the Border and Customs Police. None of which have performed their jobs effectively. Thus one of the most important positions in Iraq in 2003 was squandered while the resistance movement grew.      

     The goal of an occupation is to gradually turn military operations into police operations and a militarized state into one of civilian control based on law and order. Therefore, fielding a viable police force with political legitimacy amongst its own people should be the first priority of any occupation. Indigenous people are more likely to support security forces from their own country rather than foreigners with alien values and beliefs. Without an indigenous police force, the occupying soldiers have to conduct the necessary police operations, which they are ill-equipped culturally to do.          

     In a guerrilla war, there is a constant struggle between the occupier and the insurgents for the allegiance of the people. If the insurgent is seen as a genuine resistance fighter, his presence will be concealed from the occupiers and no intelligence on his activities will be forthcoming. The goal of the occupiers is to erase the perception of the insurgent as a heroic resistance fighter and instead make it clear that attacking the security forces is a crime and the resistance is not heroic, but criminal. Once the resistance fighter is seen as a criminal, then actionable intelligence will be given to the security forces         

     Ultimately, capturing insurgents should be a matter of local Iraqi police forces picking up wanted criminals. We shouldn't be seeing US forces conducting house to house searches, roadblocks, checkpoints or protecting VIPs. Every "police" operation our combat forces engage in is another example of how we have failed to accomplish our most important mission in Iraq: building up the Iraqi police and army so they can effectively take the place of the foreigners with alien values and beliefs.