U.S. Defense

Although in regards to Iran, Bush used his favorite phrase, “all options are on the table,” he did say, military action would not be his first choice. More importantly, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen admitted “opening up a third front right now would be extremely stressful on us — that doesn’t mean we don’t have capacity or reserves — that would really very challenging, and the consequences on that would be difficult to predict.” But I’m convinced that the solution still lies in using other elements of national power to change Iranian behaviour, including diplomatic, financial and international pressure.”  

With nationalist resistance in Afghanistan and Iraq starting to pick up again, is this really the right time to open a third front? While the Army and Marines are bearing the brunt of occupying the first two fronts, the Air Force and Navy would be conducting the initial assault against the third front in Iran. But what then? Destroying a few buildings with centrifuges and some Iranian military capability will not slow down appreciably Iranian enrichment activities, if that is what they are doing. To have any kind of long term objective, any air attack on Iran must be followed up with a ground presence.  

Unlike Iraq’s armed forces which had been retrograded from 1991 to 2003 by US action and sanctions, Iran’s military is expanding and acquiring greater stand off capabilities. Unlike Afghanistan and Iraq, where US forces pretty much just waltzed in as far as invasions go, Iran will not be as easy. Getting in will be bloody and the occupation will be resisted by a professional guerrilla organization, Hezbollah. 

The US won’t attack Iran because it can’t. Or in the words of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, it will be “challenging” and “difficult.”

Yesterday evening the Foreign Policy Association hosted a lecture by Ambassador Ronald Neumann (retired), current President of the American Academy of Diplomacy. As the former US Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2004 – 2007, Mr. Neumann has intimate knowledge of what happened there and also with the current situation.  Streaming video of his lecture can be seen on the FPA website.

Ambassador Neumann took some questions, which were not featured on the video, but his answers were important so I include a summary below.

The first question was about the opium trade. Neumann concurred that drugs were a major problem there. The money to be made from poppies is so great that it too has played a hand in corrupting traditional Afghan society. The US must make an anti-drug policy part of our counter-insurgency program. He discussed the problems with some of the methods that had been tried to deal with the drug problem. The British tried to buy the opium crop in 2003, but all this accomplished was that more opium was planted to sell to the British! The farmers only make about 600-700 million on a crop of opium. Meanwhile the Afghans who ship it and deal it can mark up the price and make roughly four times that amount. This creates a good situation for the farmers as now they have two markets to sell to, the occupation forces and the dealers. So, if the British want to try to buy the opium, they will end up in a bidding war with the dealers who are willing to pay almost four times its worth because they know they can still turn a profit. Since the farmers are guaranteed a buyer, more opium will be grown, so buying the crop is not the solution. 

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are largely being fought by conventional military forces. However, America is also engaged in low intensity conflicts in other countries, mostly using US Army Special Forces (SF).  

One conflict we have been heavily engaged in over the years is the 40 year long people’s war in Colombia. The FARC rebels have been one of the most effective guerrilla armies in history. They have consistently been able to defend themselves from the more numerous and better equipped government security forces. They have even launched successful attacks of their own. All of this despite US aid to the Colombian military of over 600 million a year as part of Plan Colombia. And in addition to all the money, we also give them Black Hawk and OH-6 helicopters. 

America’s secret war against the FARC is being fought mostly by the US Army 7^th Special Forces Group who are training the Colombian army in counter-drug and counter-insurgency tactics. Although it is officially denied, the SF “advisors” are probably fighting alongside the Colombians as well. However, the Department of Defense does not want to risk casualties too often, so the SF element is complemented with security contractors such as Dyncorp and Air Scan that spray the herbicide, conduct the air surveillance and mark targets for the Colombian army. 

Like I said, despite this massive influx of military power, the FARC have more than held their own, until recently. The BBC is today reporting that the founder of FARC, Manuel Marulanda, has died of a heart attack in the jungle. If this is true, it could be the final nail in the coffin of the FARC as it has suffered major setbacks. Just two months ago, Raul Reyes, one of the most senior commanders of FARC was killed in an air strike and the group’s dwindling numbers attest to the fact that FARC is in decline. Perhaps like Sendero Luminoso, they may be defeated as a revolutionary organization, but will continue as a drug cartel.  

The role of America in FARC’s decline can be instructive to the “War on Terror” operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US kept its role in Colombia limited to Special Forces advisory efforts and allowing the country’s own security forces to conduct military operations. Even with a small US component, indigenous security efforts, and massive aid, the counter-insurgency program has taken over twenty years to come to the point where the FARC is in noticeable decline and its leaders are being killed or captured. However, it could be just as true to say, the FARC had been winning this campaign the whole time since it took the Colombian military with US backing over twenty years to bring it to this point.

We are fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the opposite way. We are using conventional forces to conduct large scale operations with little help from the indigenous security forces, or at least, very ineffective help. If we keep going this way, we will be fighting these two wars for the next twenty years like we did in Colombia, but with a lot less to show for it.

     General Ricardo Sanchez, the former commander of coalition forces in Iraq, has belittled the service of Bernard Kerik for failing to produce results while Kerik was the interim minister of interior of Iraq in 2003. In that position, Kerik was supposed to oversee the rebuilding of the National Police, the Intelligence Service and the Border and Customs Police. None of which have performed their jobs effectively. Thus one of the most important positions in Iraq in 2003 was squandered while the resistance movement grew.      

     The goal of an occupation is to gradually turn military operations into police operations and a militarized state into one of civilian control based on law and order. Therefore, fielding a viable police force with political legitimacy amongst its own people should be the first priority of any occupation. Indigenous people are more likely to support security forces from their own country rather than foreigners with alien values and beliefs. Without an indigenous police force, the occupying soldiers have to conduct the necessary police operations, which they are ill-equipped culturally to do.          

     In a guerrilla war, there is a constant struggle between the occupier and the insurgents for the allegiance of the people. If the insurgent is seen as a genuine resistance fighter, his presence will be concealed from the occupiers and no intelligence on his activities will be forthcoming. The goal of the occupiers is to erase the perception of the insurgent as a heroic resistance fighter and instead make it clear that attacking the security forces is a crime and the resistance is not heroic, but criminal. Once the resistance fighter is seen as a criminal, then actionable intelligence will be given to the security forces         

     Ultimately, capturing insurgents should be a matter of local Iraqi police forces picking up wanted criminals. We shouldn’t be seeing US forces conducting house to house searches, roadblocks, checkpoints or protecting VIPs. Every “police” operation our combat forces engage in is another example of how we have failed to accomplish our most important mission in Iraq: building up the Iraqi police and army so they can effectively take the place of the foreigners with alien values and beliefs.  

In this month’s Esquire magazine, Thomas Barnett fawns over Admiral Fallon, Commander of Central Command (CENTCOM). He laughably calls Fallon “The Man Between War and Peace.” Fallon is not between anything. As commander of CENTCOM he is currently waging two wars and will unhesitatingly start another one if he feels it is necessary.

It’s ironic that the media first painted Fallon as the man who was specifically chosen by the Bush administration to lead a war against Iran. The thought behind this was that since the Army was bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq, it couldn’t possibly invade Iran. Therefore, Iran had to be attacked by the Air Force and Navy because they were the only branches of the military not hollowed out by those two occupations. They were ready for the kill. Who better to lead the air attack than a former ground attack pilot and commander of carrier battle groups?

Now the media would have us believe he is serving as a spoiler to Bush’s plan to attack Iran. They quote him saying negative things about Petraeus (which is possible, flag rank officers tend to be arrogant and disparaging of each other), and that an attack on Iran won’t happen on his watch (doubtful he ever said that). If any regional commander tried to spoil his commander in chief’s plans, then that regional commander would be fired and a more pliant officer put in his place. After all, the military is supposed to obey the civilians, not the other way around.

Barnett’s article is a liberal’s dream: a decorated admiral and regional commander standing up to President Bush and preventing him from starting another war. Unfortunately, ‘tis but a dream. A more realistic assessment of Fallon is by Chris Floyd who writes that there are only “a few mild disagreements between Fallon and the White House over certain questions of tactics, timing and presentation in regard to American domination of a vast range of nations and peoples.” A mere question of tactics, not strategy. On that, they are in perfect agreement; the military option is still on the table for Iran. And if it comes to war, the good admiral says, “These guys are ants. When the time comes, you crush them.”

Fallon is a Man Of War and will go to war when ordered to do so. War is not just his job, it is his way of life.

UPDATE: Fallon has been forcibly “retired,” but the reasons are why I said they would be. The commander in chief has lost confidence in Fallon and can’t be perceived as not having a unified team for his foreign policy. The next commander will have learned from the Fallon example and be much more compliant with the president’s views.

America is already operating in Pakistan covertly, with CIA and Special Forces on the ground and Predator drones in the air. However, whether the US Army itself will cross the border and cut off the insurgent sanctuary as it did in Cambodia in 1970, remains to be seen. President Musharraf has repeatedly warned Bush about the consequences of Americans violating Pakistan’s sovereignty and taking on the tribal areas themselves saying, “the man in the street will not allow this — he will come out and agitate.” So, an increased presence of Americans risks playing into the hands of Al Qaeda’s propaganda, and increasing the ire of regular Pakistanis, but not to use US forces risks not achieving important military goals.

The New York Times reports that “the top two American intelligence officials traveled secretly to Pakistan early this month to press President Musharraf to allow the CIA greater latitude to operate in the tribal territories where Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other militant groups are all active.” Although Musharraf has denied the US unilateral means to operate inside Pakistan, he will allow better coordination of joint activities. This includes sharing of actionable intelligence so Pakistani forces can do the actual mission and increasing the number and scope of missions by armed Predator surveillance aircraft. Does this mean US operators have the power to attack with the Predators on their own volition or will they have to seek permission from the Pakistanis? These rules of engagement and the speed of decision will mean the difference between a successful hit and a target that gets away.

UPDATE: The Asia Times reports that the US has completed construction and made operational ”a military base in Afghanistan’s Kunar province, just three kilometers from Bajaur Agency in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The new US base is expected to serve as the center of clandestine special forces’ operations in the border region.”