U.S. Defense

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are largely being fought by conventional military forces. However, America is also engaged in low intensity conflicts in other countries, mostly using US Army Special Forces (SF).  

One conflict we have been heavily engaged in over the years is the 40 year long people’s war in Colombia. The FARC rebels have been one of the most effective guerrilla armies in history. They have consistently been able to defend themselves from the more numerous and better equipped government security forces. They have even launched successful attacks of their own. All of this despite US aid to the Colombian military of over 600 million a year as part of Plan Colombia. And in addition to all the money, we also give them Black Hawk and OH-6 helicopters. 

America’s secret war against the FARC is being fought mostly by the US Army 7^th Special Forces Group who are training the Colombian army in counter-drug and counter-insurgency tactics. Although it is officially denied, the SF “advisors” are probably fighting alongside the Colombians as well. However, the Department of Defense does not want to risk casualties too often, so the SF element is complemented with security contractors such as Dyncorp and Air Scan that spray the herbicide, conduct the air surveillance and mark targets for the Colombian army. 

Like I said, despite this massive influx of military power, the FARC have more than held their own, until recently. The BBC is today reporting that the founder of FARC, Manuel Marulanda, has died of a heart attack in the jungle. If this is true, it could be the final nail in the coffin of the FARC as it has suffered major setbacks. Just two months ago, Raul Reyes, one of the most senior commanders of FARC was killed in an air strike and the group’s dwindling numbers attest to the fact that FARC is in decline. Perhaps like Sendero Luminoso, they may be defeated as a revolutionary organization, but will continue as a drug cartel.  

The role of America in FARC’s decline can be instructive to the “War on Terror” operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US kept its role in Colombia limited to Special Forces advisory efforts and allowing the country’s own security forces to conduct military operations. Even with a small US component, indigenous security efforts, and massive aid, the counter-insurgency program has taken over twenty years to come to the point where the FARC is in noticeable decline and its leaders are being killed or captured. However, it could be just as true to say, the FARC had been winning this campaign the whole time since it took the Colombian military with US backing over twenty years to bring it to this point.

We are fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the opposite way. We are using conventional forces to conduct large scale operations with little help from the indigenous security forces, or at least, very ineffective help. If we keep going this way, we will be fighting these two wars for the next twenty years like we did in Colombia, but with a lot less to show for it.

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles are a family of armored fighting vehicles designed to survive IED attacks and ambushes in Iraq and Afghanistan. In an article called “Hopes for Vehicle Questioned After Iraq Blast,” the New York Times described the first loss of a soldier in a MRAP. However, this soldier was a turret gunner and was mostly outside of the vehicle when the explosion hit it. Did he die of fragmentation or did the vehicle roll over on him? The cause of death isn’t clear. The other three soldiers actually inside the vehicle survived with minor injuries. An obvious conclusion would be that the vehicle’s skin saved them and that MRAPs work. Until we learn the cause of death of the turret gunner and where exactly the IED went off in relation to the vehicle, we can’t make a completely accurate assessment of the survivability of the MRAP in real combat conditions and not a controlled environment like in Army tests.

The MRAP is not without other problems as one critic notes: it’s big and heavy, which limits its mobility, especially in urban terrain, and it can’t be towed by a similiar vehicle. It’s height is also a liability in urban terrain as it becomes an easy target for armor hunting insurgents. Speed and mobility is being traded for brute force protection. The problem is that if you have the speed you probably don’t need the protection, but if you are slow and heavy, you better have all the protection you need. There is a Navy saying that “Speed is life,” which may be applicable to the MRAP.

All of this leads to questions about the effectiveness of the MRAP, but even if it performs as advertised it still is just a tactical solution to a strategic problem. It is a tactical question to ask, can a MRAP survive an IED hit, but a better, more strategic question is, why are Iraqis planting IEDs to hit MRAPs? The MRAP is merely a stopgap measure to lower the body count of American dead and pre-empt the American people from asking that strategic question.