U.S. Defense

Although in regards to Iran, Bush used his favorite phrase, “all options are on the table,” he did say, military action would not be his first choice. More importantly, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen admitted “opening up a third front right now would be extremely stressful on us — that doesn’t mean we don’t have capacity or reserves — that would really very challenging, and the consequences on that would be difficult to predict.” But I’m convinced that the solution still lies in using other elements of national power to change Iranian behaviour, including diplomatic, financial and international pressure.”  

With nationalist resistance in Afghanistan and Iraq starting to pick up again, is this really the right time to open a third front? While the Army and Marines are bearing the brunt of occupying the first two fronts, the Air Force and Navy would be conducting the initial assault against the third front in Iran. But what then? Destroying a few buildings with centrifuges and some Iranian military capability will not slow down appreciably Iranian enrichment activities, if that is what they are doing. To have any kind of long term objective, any air attack on Iran must be followed up with a ground presence.  

Unlike Iraq’s armed forces which had been retrograded from 1991 to 2003 by US action and sanctions, Iran’s military is expanding and acquiring greater stand off capabilities. Unlike Afghanistan and Iraq, where US forces pretty much just waltzed in as far as invasions go, Iran will not be as easy. Getting in will be bloody and the occupation will be resisted by a professional guerrilla organization, Hezbollah. 

The US won’t attack Iran because it can’t. Or in the words of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, it will be “challenging” and “difficult.”

Yesterday evening the Foreign Policy Association hosted a lecture by Ambassador Ronald Neumann (retired), current President of the American Academy of Diplomacy. As the former US Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2004 – 2007, Mr. Neumann has intimate knowledge of what happened there and also with the current situation.  Streaming video of his lecture can be seen on the FPA website.

Ambassador Neumann took some questions, which were not featured on the video, but his answers were important so I include a summary below.

The first question was about the opium trade. Neumann concurred that drugs were a major problem there. The money to be made from poppies is so great that it too has played a hand in corrupting traditional Afghan society. The US must make an anti-drug policy part of our counter-insurgency program. He discussed the problems with some of the methods that had been tried to deal with the drug problem. The British tried to buy the opium crop in 2003, but all this accomplished was that more opium was planted to sell to the British! The farmers only make about 600-700 million on a crop of opium. Meanwhile the Afghans who ship it and deal it can mark up the price and make roughly four times that amount. This creates a good situation for the farmers as now they have two markets to sell to, the occupation forces and the dealers. So, if the British want to try to buy the opium, they will end up in a bidding war with the dealers who are willing to pay almost four times its worth because they know they can still turn a profit. Since the farmers are guaranteed a buyer, more opium will be grown, so buying the crop is not the solution. 

On Thursday, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates forced Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Moseley and Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne to resign and appointed a former secretary of defense to devise new ways to better guard nuclear weapons. To justify this extraordinary move, Gates has pointed to a Pentagon report chronicling gross negligence in the way the Air Force has been safekeeping its nuclear weapons. However, considering this decapitation of the Air Force leadership comes so quickly after April’s verbal attack against the Air Force, something more must be going on behind the scenes.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are largely being fought by conventional military forces. However, America is also engaged in low intensity conflicts in other countries, mostly using US Army Special Forces (SF).  

One conflict we have been heavily engaged in over the years is the 40 year long people’s war in Colombia. The FARC rebels have been one of the most effective guerrilla armies in history. They have consistently been able to defend themselves from the more numerous and better equipped government security forces. They have even launched successful attacks of their own. All of this despite US aid to the Colombian military of over 600 million a year as part of Plan Colombia. And in addition to all the money, we also give them Black Hawk and OH-6 helicopters. 

America’s secret war against the FARC is being fought mostly by the US Army 7^th Special Forces Group who are training the Colombian army in counter-drug and counter-insurgency tactics. Although it is officially denied, the SF “advisors” are probably fighting alongside the Colombians as well. However, the Department of Defense does not want to risk casualties too often, so the SF element is complemented with security contractors such as Dyncorp and Air Scan that spray the herbicide, conduct the air surveillance and mark targets for the Colombian army. 

Like I said, despite this massive influx of military power, the FARC have more than held their own, until recently. The BBC is today reporting that the founder of FARC, Manuel Marulanda, has died of a heart attack in the jungle. If this is true, it could be the final nail in the coffin of the FARC as it has suffered major setbacks. Just two months ago, Raul Reyes, one of the most senior commanders of FARC was killed in an air strike and the group’s dwindling numbers attest to the fact that FARC is in decline. Perhaps like Sendero Luminoso, they may be defeated as a revolutionary organization, but will continue as a drug cartel.  

The role of America in FARC’s decline can be instructive to the “War on Terror” operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US kept its role in Colombia limited to Special Forces advisory efforts and allowing the country’s own security forces to conduct military operations. Even with a small US component, indigenous security efforts, and massive aid, the counter-insurgency program has taken over twenty years to come to the point where the FARC is in noticeable decline and its leaders are being killed or captured. However, it could be just as true to say, the FARC had been winning this campaign the whole time since it took the Colombian military with US backing over twenty years to bring it to this point.

We are fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the opposite way. We are using conventional forces to conduct large scale operations with little help from the indigenous security forces, or at least, very ineffective help. If we keep going this way, we will be fighting these two wars for the next twenty years like we did in Colombia, but with a lot less to show for it.

     General Ricardo Sanchez, the former commander of coalition forces in Iraq, has belittled the service of Bernard Kerik for failing to produce results while Kerik was the interim minister of interior of Iraq in 2003. In that position, Kerik was supposed to oversee the rebuilding of the National Police, the Intelligence Service and the Border and Customs Police. None of which have performed their jobs effectively. Thus one of the most important positions in Iraq in 2003 was squandered while the resistance movement grew.      

     The goal of an occupation is to gradually turn military operations into police operations and a militarized state into one of civilian control based on law and order. Therefore, fielding a viable police force with political legitimacy amongst its own people should be the first priority of any occupation. Indigenous people are more likely to support security forces from their own country rather than foreigners with alien values and beliefs. Without an indigenous police force, the occupying soldiers have to conduct the necessary police operations, which they are ill-equipped culturally to do.          

     In a guerrilla war, there is a constant struggle between the occupier and the insurgents for the allegiance of the people. If the insurgent is seen as a genuine resistance fighter, his presence will be concealed from the occupiers and no intelligence on his activities will be forthcoming. The goal of the occupiers is to erase the perception of the insurgent as a heroic resistance fighter and instead make it clear that attacking the security forces is a crime and the resistance is not heroic, but criminal. Once the resistance fighter is seen as a criminal, then actionable intelligence will be given to the security forces         

     Ultimately, capturing insurgents should be a matter of local Iraqi police forces picking up wanted criminals. We shouldn’t be seeing US forces conducting house to house searches, roadblocks, checkpoints or protecting VIPs. Every “police” operation our combat forces engage in is another example of how we have failed to accomplish our most important mission in Iraq: building up the Iraqi police and army so they can effectively take the place of the foreigners with alien values and beliefs.  

General Petraeus has been tapped to be the new commander of Central Command and his current deputy, Lt-Gen Ray Odierno will succeed him as Commanding General, Multi-National Force - Iraq. It’s interesting to note that like most generals in the army, both men do not have combat experience as infantrymen. 

When I was a soldier in the early 1990s, all of our generals and senior sergeants had Combat Infantry Badges (CIB) from Vietnam and they were hardcore. You could tell just by looking at them that these old guys were killers. I don’t know how many generals are left with Vietnam service, but it can’t be many, although retired General Tommy Franks who commanded the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 was a Vietnam veteran. His successor, General Abizaid had a CIB but it was for taking part in the invasion of the small, helpless Caribbean country of Grenada, which could hardly be considered “war.” After him came Admiral Fallon who was a Navy pilot in Vietnam, but again, no infantry combat experience. Now General Petraeus will be in charge of Central Command and he and Odierno do not have CIBs.

The CIB is the mark of a combat soldier who has been there, done that and got the stories to go with it. It used to be that having a CIB was practically a prerequisite for any infantry officer trying to become a general. I can’t remember seeing or reading about any general from 1945 up through the 1990s who didn’t have the CIB on his uniform.

Since Vietnam however, actual ground combat has been a rare occurrence and therefore not many officers from the 1970s – 1990s have seen real action. This is reflected in the lack of CIBs amongst currently serving general officers. General Petraeus, for instance,  does not have a CIB. He does have the newly created Combat Action Badge, which apparently generals can receive, which is ridiculous. How many generals have had to “close with and destroy the enemy” in Iraq? Did Petraeus engage in urban combat and clear buildings room by room? I am not calling his bravery into question or his toughness. He must be tough to survive a gunshot to the chest even if it was from one of his own soldiers. But to give a general who is sitting in a Tactical Operations Center the same badge as the soldiers who are fighting and dying on his orders lessens the award. That is why the CIB can only be given out to colonels and below. At least colonels might actually be somewhat near a firefight at some point.

Just because most army generals have never been in direct combat doesn’t mean they aren’t as competent directing combat operations as those who have. But to the grunts on the front line it probably matters a lot to know if the guy ordering you to fight and perhaps die has been in the same situation himself and knows what he is asking.  

In addition to the physical casualties US ground troops are incurring, there are the just as debilitating psychological casualties as well. The US Army is alarmed about the growing number of active and veteran soldiers who have PTSD or will be possible future victims of it. The New York Times reports that a recent study by the US Army surgeon general’s Mental Health Advisory Team shows that “among combat troops sent to Iraq for the third or fourth time, more than one in four show signs of anxiety, depression or acute stress,” which are signs of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Considering the fact that the Army will have to send more soldiers than ever back to Iraq on multiple tours has the Army concerned about the long term effect on not just the soldiers themselves, but on the Army as a whole and its ability to defend US interests in the world. In other words, tactical combat stress in Iraq is becoming a matter of strategic concern for the Department of Defense.

Every war takes its toll on the men who fight in it. Some wars more than others, however. The type of combat and the terrain soldiers are fighting in, along with the motives for fighting seem to have a direct effect on how many and what kind of psychological stress soldiers will suffer from.

The type of combat engaged in Iraq is a guerrilla war in an urban setting. Without a doubt the worst combination of factors a soldier can be up against. Urban combat is the most deadly terrain for an attacking army. It is as close and personal as war can get. It also requires great speed and violence of action. Life or death can be decided in a matter of seconds, if that long. Since the guerrillas will be operating amongst civilians either by force or willingly, civilians will be killed and possibly in greater numbers than combatants. Women and children will also be caught in the crossfire and killed either by accident or as a tactical necessity.

The enemy is unknown and most of the time unseen. He leaves improvised explostive devices that kill anonymously, he attacks from inside crowds that protect him, he attacks where and when least expected. He can even be a she. The soldier can never fully trust anybody not to be a combatant in an urban guerrilla war. This feeling of always being in a combat situation wherever they go is a constant stress factor. In a war without a discernable frontline, combat and the potential to become a casualty is a 24 hours a day, 360 degree reality.

 Besides combat, other factors are: a civilian population that does not welcome foreigners, an unpopular war with an open-ended mission, a lack of predictability and an alien culture with different norms. 

The NY Times report continues, “the range of symptoms reported by soldiers varies widely, from sleeplessness and anxiety to more severe depression and stress. To assist soldiers facing problems, the Army has begun to hire more civilian mental health professionals while directing Army counselors to spend more time with frontline units.” At last the Army is beginning to accept the fact that PTSD is a real casualty inducing phenomena and the best way to heal it is to be where it happens and when it happens, in the combat zone with the combat troops. 

4,000

From March 13-16, former soldiers who served in Iraq and Afghanistan are giving eyewitness testimony to what they did in that country. Unlike filtered news from the military, or the biased news from the media, this is the visceral truth, straight from the frontlines. Whether you are against the occupation or for it, finding out what is really going on in Iraq is a requirement to help clarify your point of view.

The courage of these soldiers is undeniable and I am not talking about their actions in combat. Exposing their innermost thoughts and revealing things about themselves that they would normally only share with their combat buddies is perhaps the bravest act of their military service. And it is a great service to their country and history as well.

To watch the video, go to www.ivaw.org.

The US military has geographically divided up the world into six regional “commands.” Northern Command, which was created in the wake of the September 11 attacks, is based in NORAD in Colorado. European Command is based in Stuttgart, Germany, so it is right in the middle of its area of responsibility (AOR). Pacific Command has as its AOR, the Pacific Ocean, Australia, and Southeast Asia, so it is well placed in Hawaii. Southern Command is in charge of controlling Latin America. Until 1997, it was located in Panama, but since the Panama Canal Treaty, SOUTHCOM was forced to relocate to Miami, Florida, because no country in the region would host it. However, it is at least still close to the region it is responsible for. That leaves Central Command and Africa Command. 

CENTCOM has been the busiest command since 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait. At the time, many observers thought CENTCOM would take the opportunity to relocate itself to Kuwait, but it stayed in its home base in Tampa, Florida. Basing an entire command in its AOR may not be necessary nor even productive anymore. The new paradigm seems to be instead of one major headquarters, having many smaller ones dotted around the AOR. This is a new concept that the CENTCOM is trying out in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Horn of Africa. The commander, General Lovelace said, the war on terror and a need to be more operationally focused compelled the Army to alter its approach. “You don’t have the element of time on your side anymore, like we did in the Cold War. We’ve got to be ready tonight. That’s why now you have that broader commitment. This is a big, dynamic theater. We track little hot spots in a time that’s exceedingly important to our nation.” George Bush’s current trip to Africa is being seen by some as laying the groundwork for the same diversified command structure for AFRICACOM, which is currently located in Germany. Bush has denied this even though every country he has visited has expressed interest in having AFRICACOM set up its base there. However, Bush did clarify that “that doesn’t mean we won’t develop some kind of office somewhere in Africa.”